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• Steel Wheel Casspir 
pulling Disc Rollers 
detonating AP mines. 
The blast pressure of rhe fuel air gas 
mixture is sufficient to set off the func-
tional PMN and PMD6 mines used, but 
not rhe PMN2, which is blast protected. 
Due to the fas t movement of the PMN2 
pressure plate during the blast, we found 
the shallow-buried mines would jump 
out of the ground, making rhem visible. 
Over most o f rhe area being 
demined, the active mines were detonated 
by steel wheels and dragged disc-rollers. 
As a check, the bulldozers would push 
the soil and dead mines in to heaps of 
earrh that were sieved mechanically to 
lim it what we missed. At that poim in 
time (1992) , all that the contract required 
was a safe surface to work on for the py-
lon repai r crews, so only fun ctional mines 
had to be removed, while UXO and dead 
mines under the surface were acceptable. Our 
crew played soccer on the svvept areas to 
prove that no active mines were left behind. 
A similar pattern appears after the 
normal steel wheel and disc rollers had 
passed. T he gaps in the pattern showed 
where a duff mine was to be found and 
the deminers then simply destroyed it. 
For clearing military-laid minefleld s this 
pattern is the big advamage of rollers as 
opposed to flails or tiller machines. The 
latter leave no such patterns and move 
around the mines that are not neutralised. 
Using a backup detection array is also an 
advantage or even a necessity. 
There are many in the demining 
commun ity who have nor really caught 
on to the South African approach of us-
ing MRV's like Casspir, Buffalo or Wolves 
linked to Steel Wheels and Rollers ro 
detonate mines while flanening and re-
moving vegetation. Putting in a machine 
rhar breaks and spreads the mines, the 
pieces of which you must later locate, 
does nor support the approach . The 
choice of starring with a flail or tiller as 
the first step in bringing technology to 
min e clearance, as is happening ar 
p resent, is coumerproducrive for several 
reasons. It will make the use of dogs and 
other detection principles a problem. 
Broken pieces of TNT mix into rhe soi l, 
making the use of dogs and or her vapour 
detecto rs dubious. T ech niques like 
Ground Penetrating Radar (CPR) also 
need the mines to be intact and upright, 
and the soil to be uniform without air 
gaps in it. Also, moving the surface shrap-
nel into the ground makes using selec-
tivity in metal detection more difflculr 
to do. Now back to rhe example. 
The total area cleared was 96,000 
square meters, cleared in fi ve weeks by 
seven men operating the machines and 
gas. One man was hurt on the bulldozer 
when he removed the visor of rhe bomb 
suit he was wearing because of the hear. 
This bomb suit and helmet was used 
by the driver of the bulldozer. The hel-
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met and visor are considerably stronger 
than rhe types used by deminers. T hese 
can stop the shrapnel of a Val mara jump-
ing mine at a distance of one meter. This 
pre-fragmented shrapnel is equivalent to 
that of a PROM I. The only problem 
with the suit is that the price is $8,000 
(U.S.) for the helmet alone! A pellet from 
a jumping mine had gotten between the 
driver's head and the helmet, grazing his 
head and drawing blood. He was lucky. 
The UN statistical figures for removing 
12,000 mines show that we should have 
had at least six casualties, two of which 
could have been fatal. 
The cost was $134,000, or$ 1 .40 per 
square meter and nine cents fo r each mine 
destroyed; 450 square meters were cleared 
per man per day. During later comracts 
where we worked under UN standards 
and then had ro also lift UXO and dead 
mines, the figures changed with rhe ad-
dition of manual demining reams who 
could work on such flat and foot "safe" 
ground at a rare of300 square meters per 
man per day-up to 15 times faster than 
normal for working in virgin min e 
fields-so ir only raised the cost to $1.50 
per square meter. In this first example, 
technology proved its value by removing 
vegetation and providing foot-safe ground. 
Another example occurred in 1996, 
during the UNAVEM III contract in 
Angola, when 4 ,880 km of road was 
cleared to a width of seven meters in o ne 
year fo r $6.5 million. We cleared 215 
mines consisting of improvised AT mines, 
normal AT mines and AP mines in rhe 
shoulders of the road and abutments of 
the bridges. A further 802 elements of 
UXO were uncovered. We used a total of 
70 men, most of whom were manual 
deminers hired from a Zimbabwean and 
a British demining company. They were 
supported by 24 Cassp irs and two C hubby 
systems run by South Africans and Angolans. 
A very important component of the 
team was the eight mine detecting dogs 
(MODs) of the American subcontractor 
and the 20 South African dogs, half of 
which were used at Cabango in Angola 
while the others were sent to Preroria ro 
run the detection component of the Re-
mote Explosive Sensing Tech niques 
(REST) system we were using for detect-
ing low- and no-metal mines while do-
ing QA behind the manual deminers. T he 
REST system did the area reduction , with 
the dogs searching out low metal conten t 
mines. They found three no-metal mines 
that rhe handheld detectors missed com-
pletely. The dogs held rhe key to the speed 
and cost advantages achieved in the con-
tract, thus proving their worth in HD. 
The total area cleared was 
34,160,000 square meters (3,416 hect-
ares or 8,440 acres), so the clearance was 
done at 19 cents per square meter (a third 
of the cost of normal manual demining), 
with 1,500 square meters cleared per man 
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Today, other demining groups that 
do nor use REST question locals and 
study other information avai lable to do 
the area reduction. In Angola, this would 
be foolhardy because AT mines need a 
veh icle wheel ro trigger their firin g 
mechanisms, and the vehicles using the 
roads were never using the full seven-
meter width. On the contrary, they were 
o ften carefully using two-wheel tracks 
weaving down the center of the wide 
road. Furthermore, at least half a dozen 
groups were laying mines at various stages 
of rhe war, so information from those 
sources was not to be trusted even if it 
was available. T he REST system has a 
scientific basis and has proved to be quite 
reliable over the course of more than 
7,000 km of road contracts. Norwegian 
People's Aid (NPA) is presently using 
REST in Angola for road clearance and 
have found that they can speed up their 
operation considerably by doing so. 
A third example concerns a contract 
done in 1998 in southern Mozambique. 
In this con tract, we cleared 1.6 million 
square meters in less than six months us-
ing 28 deminers, removing 5,400 mines 
in the process. The pricing was distorted 
because the con tract included training 
dogs, handlers and ad vanced dernining 
managers for the local Mine Action Cen-
ter (MAC) as a separate effort in the con-
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• (Left} The Casspir bomb arm with discs 
sweeping AP mines. 
(Below) AP mine blast pattern after a 
Bomb Arm with Discs, sweep. 
tract. In a separate calculation, the pric-
ing for the actual demining worked out 
at 38 cents per square meter. This was ar 
least half the going rate for manual 
demining in that area. In this contract, 
we also did some work using a Casspir 
moun ted metal detector array. It proved 
very successful. 
Based on a clearance comparison 
done on a 20,000 square merer (two beer- . 
are) piece of rhe mine fields between rhe . 
three-meter-wide detector array on rhe 
Casspir and our manual deminers using 
hand held detectors, the array managed 
to work 100 times fas ter, yet it still found 
all the AP mines that rhe deminers could 
find. The mines lifted were a mixture that 
included PMN, PMN2 and PMD6 
mines. These are all low metal content 
• While dearming a SPM limpet mine a full 
bomb suit, helmet and visor is being worn. 
These are all capable of stopping the shrapnel 
from a PROM1 mine. 
2
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 9
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol6/iss1/9
• A Mine Detecting 
Dog looking for 
mines in a road in 
Angola. 
AP mines. An important observation that 
came our of this rest was done whi le we 
were weighing and inspecting every piece 
of metal the hand-held detectors were sig-
nalling. We noticed that most of the false 
signals were pieces of shrapnel and metal 
junk like wire and borde tops that were 
either on top or in the first I Omm of soil. 
The array had been modified to ignore 
such small surface signals bur to still find 
a PM N2 on rhe surface. This was the key 
advantage of the array. 
Comments: 
• The manual deminers worked be-
hind the array, and they uncovered an 
additional I ,640 metal signals not 
marked by the array. The 30 AP mines it 
did mark were the only mines they could 
find in the two hectare sire, however. 
• The array did mark a further I 07 
pieces of metal. Therefore, the array 
marked 15 rimes less false alarms than 
rhe hand detectors wirhour missing the 
mines. So it was much more selective than 
the hand detectors. 
• In light of rhe Database of 
Demining Incident Victims (DDJV) 
facts about how manual deminers miss 
at least three percent of mines, it would 
have been interesting to have had the ar-
ray behind the deminers. We may have 
had a shocki ng result for the deminers! 
• Arrays have their coils overlapping 
and cannot leave unchecked spots, some-
thing it is suspected manual deminers can 
easily do. 
• The test was done on a mine field 
that had irs vegetation run flar and made 
foot safe by Casspirs. The mines Found 
were nonfunctional, probably due to mois-
ture ingression destroying their deronarors. 
Comparative Efficiency 
Among Commercial, 
Military and NGO 
Clearance Teams 
There really needs to be no choice 
favoring any of rhe groups on efficiency, 
unless financial consrraincs affect a bias. 
The way commercial contracts are pres-
endy structured, commercial companies 
are at a disadvantage. The size of the con-
tracts is simply too small to allow the use 
of expensive technologies to give them 
an advantage. Militaries can use such 
technologies and only pay operating 
costs. Let me illustrate this with figures 
our of our company's experience. 
In the period 1991 to 1996, we did 
11 contracts at an average contract size 
of just over $1.5 million per contract. 
Three contracts were over $2.5 million, 
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allowing the use of technology and th ree-
fold increases for price and speed. Dur-
ing the period from then until the end of 
2000, we did 28 contracts for which rhe 
average contract price was slightly less 
rhan $400,000, and there was only one 
proper contract ($2.7million in 1998) in 
which we could use rhe technology ef-
fectively. This was the third example al-
ready given above. 
The succession of small contracts 
where high capital investment and mo-
bilization cost made rhe Casspirs stay 
away virtually turned our group into a 
dog training company. The REST expe-
rience fortunately has given us additional 
knowledge in the training and use of nor-
mal MODs. T his contract size problem 
can be seen as one of the main reasons 
that the R&D component of our group 
has been moved into the South African 
government's R&D organization , the 
CSIR. R&D simply cannot be supported 
or properly used in these small demining 
contracts. The situation can be likened 
to a road building company rrying to use 
its graders and dozers to compete for the 
repai r of suburban side walk contracts. 
If any one group must bear the 
blame for retarding technology in HD ir 
musr be those responsible for fragment-
ing donor monies inro these small pack-
ages. This really leaves demining technol-
ogy in the hands of the military. The 
military has the further advantage of gen-
erally assembling the best equipment, 
even if it is quire expensive. NGOs that 
have visionary management and strong 
financial support may become the tech -
nology leaders in HD. As for the com-
mercial companies, in my opinion they 
have no hope of competing, as long as 
the prescriptive nature and size of the con-
tracts remains small as they are at present. 
The companies are then forced into us-
ing manual demining and MODs, in-
stead of the technologies that have in fact 
already proven to be more cost effective, 
faster and safer. So in the end, it will prob-
ably have to be the military, which is ac-
cused of causing the problem in the first 
place, that will have to provide the final 
solution to the problem. 
bz 
Is "Donor Fatigue" a 
Reality? If So, How Do We 
Fix it? 
(The following section comes from a 
paper I wrote entitled Why Do R&D?) 
From 1997 onwards, rhe aid money 
was always split down into such small 
pieces that technology-based techniques 
could nor be used. fr is my opinion that 
this was done to favor manual demining 
in the false belief that it would make area 
clearance cheaper. What in fact happened 
was that manual demining made area 
clearance a lor slower and in fact twice as 
expensive. This in turn drove the donors 
away because they were not getting value 
for their money, and they also saw no end 
to the problem in any of the contami-
nated countries. Humanitarian Mine 
Clearance (HMC) was seen as a bottom-
less p it into which money needed ro be 
poured for another century or two be-
fore the problem was solved! Today ev-
erybody wonders about so-called donor 
fatigue. Even worse, the clearance efficiency 
of manual demining is now being severely 
challenged-another shock for the donors. 
Instead of H M C, I predict rhar 
Commercial Clearance Contracts linked 
to much larger financial projects would 
serve ro bring high-technology techniques 
back into Mine Clearance (MC), so we 
should concentrate on these techniques. 
Apart from having a larger funding pro-
file, such contracts are run by engineer-
ing principles where speed and efficiency 
are insisted on and properly measured. I 
am thinking of contracts for building 
dams and roads, laying pipelines and re-
pairing railways that have mine clearance 
requirements. 
In this context, there has been a re-
cent incident where a survey technique 
regularly used in a HMC context was 
used in a survey done by the demining 
company contracted to do the survey. 
There was a fa tal explosion in an area 
declared clean. This let the company do-
ing a critical construction contract down. 
Talk has it that the company involved in 
the survey will nor be used again-the 
possible financial losses to the larger con-
tract due to doing the survey unscienrifi-
cally will not allow it. The same problem 
can also exist in the clearance operations. 
Whether the above is true or false, 
we observed this behavior in 1994 when 
we were contracted to redo clearance on 
th ree so-called cleared roads done by 
manual demining. We found quire a few 
additional mines left behind besides the 
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• Manual deminers 
checking the vehicle array 
paint marks and 
reclearing the whole two 
hectare mine field. 
ones that had ini tia ll y upset the road 
builders. Men simply pur down their 
tools when their bulldozer finds AT mines 
in locations that the MAC had declared 
safe. Obviously, when this type of result-
oriented MC becomes rhe order of the 
day, then technology and irs R&D com-
ponent becomes more important and 
more viable. So I put a priority on R&D . . 
Conclusion 
The management of HD must re-
flect on rhe fact rhar rhe esrabl ished tech-
niques they are now supporting as the way 
to solve the big problem are too slow, nor 
cost effective and causing roo many ca-
sualties. Only when they have successfully 
addressed these problems will the donor 
f:·uigue and other growing problems be 
solved. Finally, everybody must get much 
more serious about getting the appropri-
ate technologies inro the field.• 
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